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ESTABLISHING “ENEMY COMBATANT” AS POLITICAL RHETORIC: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAS FRAMED THE
CONVERSATION ON WARTIME PRISONERS
By PAUL ALEXANDER
The White House administration of George W. Bush faced a crisis when an
attack was committed on United States territory in September of 2001. As a
result, the administration has initiated a "War on Terror" in which they have
disregarded the Geneva Conventions and placed a huge amount of authority
in the role of the president in determining who is classified as an "enemy
combatant." This paper specifically addresses the use of the term "enemy
combatant" as a rhetorical device which the administration has used to
make a moral statement about prisoners of war. Using George Lakoff's concept of frames, the paper shows how this phrase communicates a moral
value to convince the U.S. public that these "combatants" deserve whatever
punishment the U.S. might choose to impose, up to and including torture.
Introduction
“The President has unquestioned
authority to detain enemy
combatants, including those who
are U.S. citizens, during
wartime.” William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel of the
Department of Defense,
memorandum dated December
12, 2002

The White House administration of George W. Bush has been
tasked with an overwhelming project as a response to the attacks
that took place on United States
territory in September of 2001.
Congress has granted the president
certain specific powers as a part of
what is now being called a “War
on Terror”. However, the President
and his administration have interpreted these powers too broadly
and this has resulted in the PresiCS&P
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dent and members of his administration violating international law,
specifically the Geneva Convention. This document governs how
prisoners taken in wartime are to
be treated and classified, including
the protocols and processes that
determine how this is to happen.
When the president took the “unquestioned authority” to designate
“enemy combatants”, he ignored
the process laid out in the Geneva
Convention for determining the
status of those captured in war.
In fact, the very existence of a
category called “enemy combatant” can be called into question.
Although a general concept of an
“enemy combatant” can be implied
by the Geneva Convention, the
specific nomenclature and interpretation that has emerged under
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Bush's administration is nowhere
to be found in the documents. That
terminology emerged when the
administration decided to “subsume” (Haynes, 2002) two prior
legal classifications for enemies in
wartime, “lawful” or “unlawful”
combatants, under the umbrella of
the “enemy combatant”. The distinction between these two classifications is important as it decides
how a captured prisoner will be
treated and held. Geneva Convention III, Part I, Article 5 describes
the following:
Should any doubt arise as to
whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article
4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present
Convention until such time as
their status has been determined
by a competent tribunal.

By ignoring this statement, denying tribunals, and acting as sole
authority on the designation of
POW status, the president and his
administration appear to be in violation of the Geneva Convention.
These actions have been justified
by the administration in two ways:
legally and morally. Legal challenges to detention under “enemy
combatant” status have been argued before the Supreme Court.
Additionally, as a linguistic term
“enemy combatant” has come to
CS&P
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imply ideological and moral values
which are essential to the administration for justifying illegal and
unjust detention of captured prisoners to the American public.
Existing literature explores the
legal ramifications of the administration's decision to detain socalled “enemy combatants”. I intend to focus on the concept of
“enemy combatant” not only as a
legal (or non-legal) phenomenon
but also as a piece of political
rhetoric aimed to justify the detention and torture of accused terrorists at the whim of the Bush administration. By employing this
particular piece of rhetoric, the
Bush administration has been successful in convincing the American public, and perhaps some judicial authorities, that the detention
of prisoners can be done indefinitely, without charges, and without access to legal counsel. In order to break down the concept as
rhetoric, I will examine the historical usage of the term “enemy
combatant”, especially within the
Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and during the
“War on Terror”. I believe that the
context in which the term was
originally used will provide useful
insights into the intentions of the
administration when dealing with
the identification and detention of
accused terrorists. In addition, I
will examine the term as a frame, a
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concept developed by linguist and
cognitive psychologist George Lakoff to uncover how politicians use
language to associate issues or
ideas with particular moral values.
In this case, “enemy combatant” is
a frame that has been used to identify anyone who is detained as potentially dangerous and deserving
of whatever conditions the U.S.
might impose upon them.
Method of Analysis
There are four major areas of
literature that will be the focus of
this investigation. The first is
scholarly work that has been written regarding “enemy combatants”
and their detention. Much of this
work (Cole 2002, Yuu 2003,
Priester 2004, Stumpf 2004, Sloss
2004) focuses on the role of the
judicial branch in adjudicating
cases involving people captured
and held outside of U.S. territory1.
I will briefly summarize and explain the prevalent arguments and
the response of the Bush administration to legal challenges. Additionally, I intend to show that
while scholarly and legal challenges are important and effective,
they fail to establish a competing
rhetoric to the “enemy combatant”
1 The detention center at Guantanamo
Bay, of course, provides a problematic
situation for lawyers wishing to intervene
on behalf of their clients as the U.S.
government argues that courts have no
jurisdiction there because it isn't
technically a U.S. territory.

CS&P

legal and moral system already established by the Bush administration.
The second area of literature
will encompass publicly available
documents that show how the
Bush administration developed the
thinking behind “enemy combatant”. First, I will explore the legal
and ideological predecessor to
Bush's contemporary assertion of
authority by examining the Supreme Court case Ex parte Quirin,
a case which sent six men to their
death under dubious circumstances. Additionally, I will analyze documents that advise the
president as to his legal authority
(Gonzalez memo) or attempt to establish the legal justification for
the administration's actions
(Haynes memo). My goal in discussing these documents is to establish the administration's thinking behind their actions. While I
don't expect it to be laid out clearly
in the text, it is my hope that I can
infer some sort of motivation from
an analysis that puts different
documents in conversation with
one another.
Public speeches, radio addresses, and press conferences will
constitute another area of literature
investigation. Through these I will
be able to trace the historic emergence of the “enemy combatant”
term. I am especially interested in
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the context in which it is evoked.
For example, is it used as a primarily legal term in discussions focusing on the legality of actions taken
by the U.S. or is it used by the
President in political speeches intent on rallying the American public behind a particular cause?
Where was the term first used and
who used it? Can this be correlated
with other memos or actions that
emerged around the same time?
Finally, I intend to bring UC
Berkeley linguist George Lakoff's
work in conversation with the idea
of an “enemy combatant”. Lakoff
developed the idea of linguistic
frames to explain how conservative movements in the U.S. have
been particularly effective at associating moral themes and values
with the ideas that are espoused in
their speech. Terms such as “tax
relief” and “tort reform” are examples of conservative frames. The
power of such terms is that they
form a base around which both
progressive and conservative arguments end up being framed.
Progressives cannot argue against
“tax relief” without using the term,
thereby lending the idea credence
and reinforcing it with the public. I
recognize that this paper may fall
into that trap as well and I will reflect on that and offer some suggestions for moving forward as a
part of my conclusion.
CS&P
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Legal Defenses
Various lawyers have lashed
out against the Bush administration's grab at power in relation to
the denial of habeas corpus for
U.S. citizen prisoners, the distinction made between treatment of
U.S. citizen prisoners and alien
prisoners, and the use of secret
military tribunals to try and convict captured prisoners. Additionally, the Bush administration has
presented lengthly legal defenses
of their actions in regards to prisoners and the Geneva Conventions. I will briefly sketch the components of each argument here in
order to highlight some of the successes that the human rights regime has enjoyed as well as identify areas where their work could
be improved. In addition, I will
provide some counter arguments
as the legal debate is very contentious and the human rights viewpoint is not the only voice speaking out.
David Cole wrote about the differentiation in the way that the
U.S. treats prisoners captured as a
part of the “War on Terror” depending on whether or not they are
U.S. citizens. He cautions against
disregarding the liberties of immigrants in favor of security despite
the obvious need for a rigorous examination of security in the wake
of the September 11 attacks (Cole
2002:1004). Cole is able to look
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back at other times in U.S. history
when prejudice and stereotypes
controlled our response and believes if we are cautious then perhaps we won't have to look back
upon this time with regret. Juliet
Stumpf examines similar themes
and also believes that we need to
be cautious in the way that we proceed when handling alien combatants (Stumpf 2004:139).
John Yuu and James Ho, on the
other hand, are supportive of the
treatment and classification system
used by the Bush administration.
They conclude that the “armed
conflict” in which the U.S. is engaged is not against a group that
can be a party to the Geneva Conventions and thus the U.S. response should be to classify captured prisoners as unlawful combatants and deny them the right to
prisoner of war treatment (Yuu and
Ho 2003:228). Yuu will later go on
to denounce the position taken by
the Bush administration in regards
to their justification of torture of
Guantanamo prisoners. Although I
lack the legal pedigree that Yuu
does I disagree with his reading of
the Geneva Conventions, as I will
explain below.
David Sloss explored the Rasul
vs. Bush case that was heard before the Supreme Court and found
that the defense provided by the
U.S. government was “untenable”

CS&P

as it relied in part on international
law such as the Geneva Conventions and also in part on common
law that was established prior to
and superseded by the Conventions (Sloss 2004:798). Benjamin
Priester disagrees as he believes
that the Geneva Conventions support a classification of unlawful
combatant which would allow the
Bush administration to detain, try,
and punish captured prisoners who
were members of the Taliban and
al Qaida (Priester 2004:7).
Throughout the various legal
battles, arguments against the Bush
administration's decisions regarding the Geneva Convention and
were strongly made. Unfortunately, they were made on purely
legal grounds, often ignoring the
history of the concept of “enemy
combatants”. I hope to add to the
strength of these arguments by examining some of the rhetorical and
other non-legal reasons that the
Bush administration adopted the
policies it did.
Origin of the Enemy Combatant
It is impossible to talk about the
contemporary use of military
courts to prosecute detained alleged terrorists without looking
back upon the historic Supreme
Court case which the Bush administration is using as a basis for their
new legal outlook on wartime
prisoners. In
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the 1942 case, Ex parte Quirin,
eight accused saboteurs who had
traveled from Germany to the U.S.
in U-boats with orders to blow up
aluminum manufacturing plants
were caught by the FBI, tried by a
military tribunal, and then six of
them were sentenced to death and
promptly executed. This happened
despite the fact that all of the men
had once lived in the U.S., many
for long periods of time. In addition, the only reason they were
caught was because two of the
saboteurs were intent on defecting
to the U.S. by turning themselves
and the other saboteurs into the
FBI. Despite the fact that the FBI
had no knowledge of the saboteurs
before one of the group turned
themselves in, the presentation to
the media was such that it appeared the FBI had been staked out
on the beach just waiting for the
enemy to show up. The tribunals
were created on order of President
Franklin Roosevelt and bypassed
any chance that the men would
have their case tried in a civilian
court.
The military tribunals were
used in part to shroud the case in
secrecy so that the image of the
U.S. and FBI as vigilant and successful at infiltrating German operations could be presented to and
maintained with the public. In addition, it is thought that Roosevelt
was convinced from the beginning
CS&P
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that the accused saboteurs must be
put to death, regardless of the outcome of the trial, and the tribunal
was used to insure this result. The
Army-appointed defense lawyer in
the case, Col. Kenneth Royall,
fought vigorously to have the trial
moved to civilian court but failed
in his appeal to the Supreme Court.
The entire process was over
quickly, taking only six weeks
from the time the men were captured, and the Supreme Court did
not deliver an opinion on the case
until twelve weeks after the saboteurs had already been executed.
The justices involved would later
show regret over how the case was
handled (Dobbs 2004:B04).
It is this case, one that holds
dubious standards of justice, that is
being used to justify the contemporary decision of the President to
hold and try “enemy combatants”
in military institutions rather than
civil ones. Further, the President
relies on a similar rhetoric to establish that the prisoners being
held at Guantanamo Bay as “enemy combatants” are deserving of
their fate: harsh and cruel treatment, punishing interrogations,
and periods of detention that have
stretched into years without any
indication that the prisoners will be
accused or tried. For the Bush administration, the Ex parte Quirin
case establishes both a legal and
rhetorical precedent for achieving
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the result that the President wants
to see, regardless of whether justice is being served.
The specific term “enemy combatant” actually originates in this
case. In the following quote we
can see its only usage in the entire
judgment:
By universal agreement and
practice the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed
forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations
and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants.
Lawful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing
military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject
to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial
and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful. The
spy who secretly and without
uniform passes the military lines
of a belligerent in time of war,
seeking to gather military
information and communicate it
to the enemy, or an enemy
combatant who without uniform
comes secretly through the lines
for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property,
are familiar examples of
belligerents who are generally
deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to
be offenders against the law of
war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals.
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
[1942])

CS&P

Interestingly, when read the way I
think it was intended, enemy combatant as it is used here does nothing but refer to an individual fighting for the enemy in a time of war.
It does not establish an additional
legal category beyond lawful and
unlawful combatants that were, at
the time the opinion was offered,
outlined in the laws of war from
the Hague Convention. These
categories were refined in the Geneva Convention, as discussed
above, which was signed after the
conclusion of World War II.
Further, the Supreme Court in
this case refer specifically to enemies crossing into the territory of
the U.S. and abandoning their uniforms in order to commit acts of
violence or destruction:
By passing our boundaries for
such purposes [acts of war]
without uniform or other emblem
signifying their belligerent status,
or by discarding that means of
identification after entry, such
enemies become unlawful
belligerents subject to trial and
punishment. (Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 [1942])

Because the Court is so specific
about belligerents' characteristics
and the nature of their actions, it
would be difficult to use this case
as legal precedence for combatants
who were captured on a field of
battle outside of U.S. territory.
However, that is exactly how the
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case is being used by the Bush
administration.
Characterizing the Enemy,
Establishing Authority
Beginning with a Presidential
military order issued on November 13,
2001, the Bush administration began a
systematic process to establish the
President as the sole authority for
determining who would be considered a
POW amongst those captured in the
“War on Terror”2. The order, among
other things, states that the president has
the authority to determine who will be
held and tried within military
institutions, so long as they are
associated with al Qaida and pose a
threat to the nation. The criteria are
broad and subject to a huge variance in
interpretation and, again, the final arbiter
of decisions is the President. The
President establishes that these people
will be tried through military tribunal
with proceedings held in secret. Further,
the order amazingly disallows persons
who fall into this category any sort of
remedy in U.S. courts, foreign courts, or
courts with an international jurisdiction.
The order establishes these rules without
justifying a legal framework which
might allow such sweeping powers to be
bestowed on the President. Instead, the
Bush administration invoked fear and a
state of emergency as the justification
for implementing the order. The
language used includes “if not detected
and prevented, will cause mass deaths,
mass injuries, and massive destruction of
property, and may place at risk the
continuity of the operations of the
2 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/print/20011113-27.html
CS&P
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United States Government,” “To protect
the United States and its citizens,” “the
danger to the safety of the United
States,” and “considered the magnitude
of the potential deaths, injuries, and
property destruction that would result
from potential acts of terrorism.” Despite
the “danger”, the order will only apply to
non-citizens who are accused by the
President.
The day after the military order was
issued, Vice President Dick Cheney
spoke at a meeting of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce3. He spoke on the war in
Afghanistan and “tax relief” and after his
remarks took a few questions from the
gathered businessmen. The final
question asked what the difference was
between the tribunals established in the
military order from the previous day and
other established procedures in the
Hague. Cheney refers to the Ex parte
Quirin case in defense of the order and
also says that the order would only apply
to individuals coming into the U.S. for
the purpose of “killing thousands of
innocent Americans, men, women, and
children”. Because of this, he says,
“They don't deserve to be treated as a
prisoner of war” as they would be
considered “unlawful combatants”.
On November 29, 2001 the President
addressed a gathering of lawyers at the
U.S. Attorneys Conference, saying that
the U.S. Attorneys are on the “front line
of war”4. In his speech, the President
refers to “unlawful combatants who seek
3 Vice President Addresses U.S. Chamber
of Commerce:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/20011114-6.html
4 President Says U.S. Attorneys on Front
Line in War:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2001/11/20011129-12.html
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to destroy our country and our way of
life.” This obviously continues to invoke
ideas of fear and emergency within the
country. Immediately after this statement
the President asserts his sole authority to
handle accused terrorists saying, “if I
determine that it is in the national
security interest of our great land to try
by military commission those who make
war on America, then we will do so.”
Interestingly, the president positions the
lawyers in the center of the war and, as
we have seen, the role of lawyers in the
Attorney General's office was significant
in attempting to establish the legitimacy
of the President's powers and the use of
torture against detained prisoners.
One day prior to Bush's address at
the lawyers conference, two attorneys,
Griffin Bell and former Attorney
General William Barr, gave testimony to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
who had convened in a meeting titled,
“Department of Justice Oversight:
Preserving Our Freedoms While
Defending Against Terrorism”5. In both
of their testimonies, the attorneys
referred to prisoners as “enemy
combatants”. This is the only use of this
specific term found in official records
between September 11, 2001 and June 9,
2002 and it was done by people
ostensibly outside of the Bush
administration. Both lawyers argued
fiercely that it is in the President's
authority as granted by the constitution
to proceed with trials by military
tribunals for members of al Qaida or
other terrorist organizations.

5 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism:
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id
=126

CS&P

By January 9, 2002 discussion of
detainees and combatants had reached
the White House press conferences6. On
that day, Ari Fleischer took a question
regarding “prisoners of war”. He
immediately countered that prisoner of
war is a legal term established in the
Geneva Conventions and is something
that needs to be established on a caseby-case basis. The reporters present
press him on exactly what international
convention the U.S. was holding people
under, with one reporter stating, “Under
the Geneva Convention and other
conventions we've signed, there's no
such thing as a detainee -- either they're
prisoners of war -- and even though they
may not, some of them may not have
had the insignia, I mean, by all legal
understandings, they are prisoners of
war.” Fleischer continues to defer to
individual legal proceedings as being the
determinant of who is or isn't a prisoner
of war but it fails to satisfy the reporters
who are pressing the legitimacy of
holding prisoners from Afghanistan
halfway around the world from where
they were captured. Fleischer eventually
takes a question that changes the subject
and leaves the reporters' concerns
unresolved.
Nineteen days later, on January 28,
Ari Fleischer again met with the press
and discussed the detainees in
Guantanamo7. The difference in his
response to questions between the two
conferences was dramatic. In the later
conference, Fleischer answered
questions with ease, drawing from an
6 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020109-5.html
7 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020128-11.html
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obviously prepared position to present a
strong argument for the legitimacy of
detainee treatment by the U.S. He stated,
“the detainees who are being held in
Cuba, the determination has been made
that they are not and will not be
considered POWs.” This determination
was made on the advice of the
President's counsel and directly
contradicts the statements made just
three weeks prior by Fleischer himself.
Fleischer's answers were much longer
and better thought through than in the
previous conference. Additionally,
Fleischer does not attempt to dodge
questions at all and instead simply sticks
to the assertions that, we will find out
later, were established by attorneys.
Finally, it is important to note that the
terminology being used here is still
“detainee” or “illegal combatant” rather
than the “enemy combatant” phrase
which comes into use later.
One day prior, on January 28,
President Bush had addressed the press
with Chairman Hamid Karzai of the
Afghan Interim Authority8. The first
question asked by reporters was in
regards to formally applying the Geneva
Convention to detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. The President asserted that he had
applied the Geneva Convention, later
going on to say that the Geneva
Conventions are not outdated and that
the U.S. has adhered to the “spirit of the
Convention.” The president, much like
Fleischer, asserted that the prisoners are
“illegal combatants” and as such will not
be afforded prisoner of war status.

8 Remarks by the President and Chairman
of the Afghan Interim Authority Hamid
Karzai:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2002/01/20020128-13.html
CS&P
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On February 7, President Bush
issued a memorandum to his
administration that made clear the
position he was taking in regard to
detainees' rights as prisoners of war9. In
the memo, he detailed a plan that would
prevent the application of Geneva
Conventions to those who were being
held by the U.S. The President concurs
with the lawyers working for the
Department of Justice which found that
it was within the President's authority to
make such determinations regarding
prisoner status, in effect granting himself
the authority to suspend the Geneva
Conventions. In the memo, Bush refers
to a “new paradigm” that the U.S. must
operate in, one “ushered in not by us, but
by terrorists”. Language that invoked “a
new kind of enemy” was common when
the administration spoke about fighting
the new “War on Terror”. Of course,
along with a new kind of enemy comes a
new way of doing things. In this case,
the hand of the President has been forced
to suspend the Geneva Conventions not
because he wants to but because the
terrorists have forced him to. The
language used to refer to prisoners is still
either “detainee” or “unlawful
combatant”.
Something interesting happens after
this memo is released. Any discussion of
“combatants” or “detainees” disappears
from Presidential speeches, Q&A
sessions, press releases, and press
conferences. When the discussion does
pick up again the term used to discuss
prisoners has changed. In a memo
produced on June 9, 2002 President
Bush ordered Secretary of Defense
9 Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees:
http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/
020207_bushmemo.pdf
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Rumsfield to hold José Padilla as an
“enemy combatant”10. The order
identified Padilla as a “grave threat” to
the safety of the U.S. and placed him in
the custody of the military. The very
next day In a press conference held by
Ari Fleischer, Padilla is referred to as an
“enemy combatant” rather than a
detainee or unlawful combatant. Padilla,
who was being held in a military brig in
the U.S., is a U.S. citizen charged as a
material witness in the September 11
terrorist attacks. Eventually the Supreme
Court found that it was Congress and not
the President who has specific powers
that could be used to detain a U.S.
citizen and deny them the right of
habeas corpus.
This sweeping trace of the
administration's official discussion of
prisoners captured in the early stages of
the “War on Terror” is revealing. It is
obvious that President Bush initially
decided to move forward under the
premise that he had the sole authority to
order military tribunals for captured
prisoners without any kind of formal
legal justification for doing so. Three
months after his initial military order
outlining the treatment and prosecution
of detainees, he followed with an order
that, not surprisingly, relied on his
administration's lawyers to legitimize his
authority. Throughout the
administration's discussion, we can see
how images of fear, danger, and
emergency were invoked to quash any
kind of resistance that might arise as a
reaction. This allowed the President to
10
Memo from Pres. George W. Bush
to U.S. Sec’y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
RE Jose Padilla designated an enemy
combatant:
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdoc
s/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf
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selectively ignore the Geneva
Conventions when they did not support
his initial goal of prosecution at his
discretion in military tribunals and he
was able to do so with little resistance
from the press or public. In the end, this
allowed the Bush administration to
invent a category of wartime prisoner,
the so-called “enemy combatant”, which
has no legal meaning or merit and
contradicted the administration's own
characterization of prisoners that was
used for the nine months following the
September 11 attacks. The press became
complicit in its usage as they parroted
the phrase back when asking questions
or referring to the Guantanamo Bay
prisoner situation. While the term has no
legal merit, its widespread acceptance
provided the administration with a
rhetorical victory, one which insured that
challenges to their prisoner paradigm
would fail not based on legal standing
but because the term framed the
discussion in such a way that it would
become difficult to talk about prisoners
without supporting the administration's
rhetoric.
Framing the Wartime Prisoner
Conversation
One way that we can attempt to
break through such powerful rhetoric is
to examine the way in which the Bush
administration and conservatives in
general strategically frame the
conversation on wartime prisoners.
George Lakoff, a linguist and cognitive
psychologist at UC Berkeley, has
developed a method for analyzing the
language and rhetoric used in politics in
order to determine the underlying values
inherent in catch phrases that are
constantly employed by politicians. He
argues that the conservative movement
in the U.S. has been dominant in recent
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years because of a long-term investment
in establishing think tanks that could
create linguistic strategies that would
force progressives to debate issues in
conservative terms, thus reinforcing
conservative values and ideals even
when arguing against them (Lakoff
200?:27).
This works through frames, or pieces
of rhetoric that evoke a particular image
when their literal meaning often belies or
contradicts the actual message. “Tax
relief” is a good example of this. The
term tax relief frames taxes as something
that people need relief from rather than
an essential investment in infrastructure,
welfare, etc. Another example is “death
tax” where the frame points to a dead
person, a loved one, being taxed after
they have passed rather than the living
recipients of the dead one's estate. The
“War on Terror” is perhaps the most
prominent and dangerous frame as it
evokes images traditionally associated
with war, such as a battlefront, invasion
or defense, surrender and victory, that
simply cannot exist in a war against a
band of loosely connected individuals.
Further, the phrase promotes the idea of
fighting fear itself even when the tactics
used by the U.S. consist of campaigns of
terror, otherwise known as shock and
awe, that affect the innocent members of
nations where the “War on Terror” is
waged.
The Bush administration spent a
great deal of time and energy on creating
a frame for prisoners captured in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The frame is
based on a legal misnomer but is still
effective at conveying ideas that make
sense, especially to the U.S. public.
“Enemy combatant” is a term that
invokes fear of an enemy, someone
CS&P
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determined to destroy the way of life
that most people in the U.S. hold dear.
Additionally, it is not the same enemy
that the U.S. has faced in the past,
perhaps during the Cold War, the
Vietnam War, or World War II.
According to the administration, this
new enemy has forced the hand of the
President and made him do things that
he doesn't want to do, such as suspend
the Geneva Conventions for captured
enemy fighters. When this frame is
placed upon a person, that individual is
immediately labeled as a combatant and
shown to be ready to fight, they were
fighting when they were captured, and it
would be dangerous to release them
because they would continue to fight and
again would threaten the safety of life in
the U.S.
A competing frame needs to be
introduced into this conversation, a task
that could be taken up by the human
rights regime that has been so vigilant in
observing and fighting for the rights of
prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay and
other U.S. prisons positioned around the
globe. Although I haven't completed a
comprehensive analysis, I believe that
continuing to use “prisoner of war” to
describe these prisoners would be an
effective frame to employ. It directly
contradicts the goals and arguments that
the Bush administration has presented
when trying to decide how to treat and
handle the prisoners. At its most basic
level, the phrase is a very accurate
description for these individuals as they
are literally prisoners taken during an
acknowledged war. It also reflects an
established piece of international law
which is very widely accepted and
understood in both the mind of the
public and international politics. Further,
it will make it difficult for the Bush
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administration to talk about the prisoners
without acknowledging the idea that
they are, in fact, prisoners of war.
Of course, putting the term into use
would require the cooperation of
progressive politicians and journalists
alike. It would have to be a conscious
movement but I believe that it is not one
lacking momentum. Lakoff's push for
progressives to re-frame the political
conversations taking place has picked up
steam and he has recently consulted with
various politicians on their campaigns in
an attempt to further the re-framing of
political debate in the U.S. It's hardly a
comprehensive answer but it would chip
away at a powerful piece of rhetoric that
has enabled the President to seize power
that does not rightfully belong to him
and has resulted in detention that ignores
the Geneva Conventions and has failed
to bring to trial or charge hundreds of
prisoners for several years.
Conclusion
Recently, more attention has been
placed on the Bush administration's
actions in regard to prisoners. A staff
editorial in the New York Times recently
attacked Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez for his threats to “muzzle” the
press. As part of their defense, they said
that Gonzalez could do many things if he
truly respected the rule of law, stating,
“He could uphold the Geneva
Conventions and the U.N. Convention
Against Torture, instead of coming up
with cynical justifications for violating
them. He could repudiate the disgraceful
fiction known as 'unlawful enemy
combatant,' which the administration
cooked up after 9/11 to deny legal rights
to certain prisoners.” (New York Times
2006:26).
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Actions such as these are promising
for remedying the situation for prisoners
held unlawfully in Guantanamo Bay and
other U.S. prisons. At the very least,
they begin to re-frame the conversation
around prisoners and move toward a
more accurate and just framework for
handling the hundreds of people we have
incarcerated without an opportunity for
release or trial. The human rights regime
has moved us to this point, vehemently
arguing for the legal rights of prisoners
who most lawyers wouldn't dare to get
near. I believe that the next step will be
to capture the public imagination by
breaking down exactly what has
happened at Guantanamo and exposing
the rhetoric used by the Bush
administration to legitimize their actions.
As a first step, I have examined the
origins of the term “enemy combatant”,
tracing its roots back to the World War
II Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin.
I then traced how the Bush
administration took this concept and
evolved it to fit their desired outcome: a
President who had the sole authority to
decide how prisoners would be tried and
punished. Finally, I examined the idea of
“enemy combatant” as a linguistic frame
and offered some ways to possibly reframe the conversation on prisoners of
war. It is my hope that this contribution
will help others move beyond the image
painted by the Bush administration and
see that our fear is moving us to deny
those things which are fundamentally
important to the U.S..
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